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SECURITY INFORMATION

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DRAFTEYES ONLY

August 5, 1952

EYES ONLYA STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAM *
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO COLD WAR OPERATIONS
UNDER NSC 10/5

1. Almost all governmental policies and actions have psychological content in that they bear on the minds and wills of other peoples. An attempt to formulate a national psychological strategy covering every intention and action having psychological impact in this sense would encompass every aspect of governmental activity. This would be an effort of unmanageable proportions. In order to formulate a national psychological strategy that will usefully subserve the national policy it is necessary to divide the task into separate aspects of manageable proportions. When we ask, "What can usefully be said about ways and means of bringing about a retraction of Soviet power and influence?" we have selected one such aspect and have stated it in such a way that we can perhaps deal with it. The following does not attempt to deal with the problems involved in the distribution of resources between cold war operations and preparations in support of overt war.

a. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power, including the relationships between the USSR, its satellites and Communist China; and when and where appropriate in the light of U. S. and Soviet capabilities and the risk of war, contribute to the retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence to limits which no longer constitute a threat to U. S. security.


* In accordance with Presidential Directive of 4 April 1951, which establishes the PSB as responsible for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance to the departments and agencies represented for psychological operations, of over-all national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and which defines psychological operations as including all activities under NSC 59/1 and 10/2.

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b. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the peoples and nations of the free world, and increase their capacity and will to resist Soviet domination.

c. Develop underground resistance and facilitate covert and guerrilla operations in strategic areas to the maximum practicable extent consistent with 1-a above"

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5. The general objective of psychological operations in the cold war can be ~~subsumed~~ under the general heading of contributing to the "retraction and reduction of Soviet power and influence" whether by operations designed to weaken Soviet power in the Communist orbit or by operations designed to weaken Soviet influence by strengthening the free world.

6. Our national strategy, as defined in NSC 20/4, paragraph 20, is to "endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war." This national strategy calls for efforts to "encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries . . . ; to eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow . . . ; (and) to create situations which will compel the Soviet government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts"

7. In the absence of open hostilities, the cold war can be expected to continue in one form or another as long as the Soviet Union, which is

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to say, the Bolshevik Party, adheres to the aims and methods which it has pursued ever since its accession to power, within as well as outside the Party. Recognition of this - particularly public recognition - is necessary for understanding and support of continuity of effort. The overthrow of the Party by war or successful revolution appears to be the only certain means of forcing such changes. One is excluded, and the other so far beyond our current capabilities as to be presently unfeasible.

8. We are unable at present to propose a strategic concept which outlines a program designed to bring about a final solution of the cold war because (a) we do not have and cannot clearly foresee the time when we will have the capabilities, and (b), because without adequate capabilities the risks involved are clearly disproportionate to the probabilities of success. The time required to develop the necessary capabilities is so great that the nature of an acceptable solution cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to serve as a guide. As our capabilities increase, flexibility and opportunism in the light of events appear presently more desirable than commitment to too specific a goal.


9. We should continue to develop our capabilities for assisting revolution and continue to re-appraise the situation. This will require both the development of further capabilities for the exploitation of existing techniques and a major program for the development of new techniques and approaches. It is possible that the cumulative effect of retraction of Soviet power and influence, together with future events and the inherent problems with which the Soviet government and the Bolshevik Party are faced may eventually bring about sufficient change in their aims and methods to provide an acceptable solution. Efforts to develop our capabilities and to bring about such a retraction as opposed to a program for a definitive solution may be regarded as the interim strategic concept for a national psychological program.

10. Within the limits imposed by the terms of our national strategy

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a. Effectiveness: The importance of the effects which successful operations may be calculated to have in reducing Soviet influence and power or in strengthening the free world against the exertion of Soviet influence and power must be appreciable and must warrant the effort, cost and risk of the operation. In general, priorities should be proportional to anticipated effectiveness.


b. Feasibility: Our capabilities in terms of trained manpower or material, and local or international support, must be adequate to give reasonable promise of success to the operation in the face of such capabilities as the Communists may have to frustrate it.

c. Acceptable risk: The degree to which the undertaking or successful conclusion of the operations may be calculated to provoke military reaction from the Communists must be sufficiently limited as to be an acceptable risk in terms of our national strategy.

d. Flexibility: Operations should be of a type which lend themselves within reasonable limits to adaptation or modification to exploit such opportunities or undertake such objectives as may become possible or advisable subsequent to actual initiation of the operation.

12. There is a wide range of activity currently in process to bring about the retraction of Soviet power and influence which should

continue. Many of these activities, although in themselves incapable of producing clear and incontrovertible gains, are of great value in supporting overt policies which can be expected to be effective. Omission from the following discussion of many existing projects, does not imply that they are not considered of value, but rather that the approved projects should continue as presently conceived and planned, insofar as they meet the above criteria.



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b. Detachment of Albania.

Because of Albania's unique geographical position, its detachment from the Soviet orbit may be feasible. The principal advantage gained would be its psychological effects both in subjugated countries and in areas under intense Soviet pressure, although there would also be useful additional by-products of a military nature, especially as regards the position of Yugoslavia and Greece. It would be a demonstration that a continuing Soviet advance is not inevitable and that a retraction of Soviet power is practically possible. A preliminary estimate indicates that detachment could be accomplished by Albanian personnel and without the overt participation of Western military forces.

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CIA should prepare a detailed priority plan of proposed action, with estimates of expected results.

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The studies and planning that are indicated involve both CIA and the State Department. Each agency should make concrete correlated proposals within the foregoing framework.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the progressive retraction of Soviet power and influence in accordance with our capabilities and subject to the limitation of acceptable risk be accepted as the interim strategic concept for a national psychological program with particular reference to cold war operations under NSC 10/5.
2. It is recommended that the responsible agencies place greatest emphasis on the three broad fields of activity identified in paragraph 13 above.
3. It is recommended that the responsible agencies give priority within those broad fields to determining the detailed practicability and desirability of proceeding along the lines indicated under each category

described in paragraph 14 above. It is further recommended that where such studies indicate that the foregoing criteria will be met, the indicated actions be given priority in both national and agency programs proportionate to their probable effectiveness.

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5. It is also recommended that this interim strategic concept be kept under continuous review, and revised in the light of future developments at least annually and also as additional categories of action appear to meet the specified criteria.

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